By now it was evident to all concerned that the ground war would reach Zeeland sooner rather than later. The question was no longer whether German forces would arrive, but when.
During the preceding days, a steady stream of retreating Dutch and Allied troops had passed westward through the province. Those columns of weary soldiers had served as a tangible reminder of the German advance. By 14 May, however, that flow had largely ceased. To many observers, this could only mean that the Germans had begun to gain control of the main roads and key junctions leading into Zeeland.
Among the men who had constructed and manned the defensive lines on Zuid-Beveland, anxiety steadily increased. The sounds of the war were drawing nearer, while reports from the east became ever more alarming. The defenders knew that the respite of the previous days was coming to an end. Soon they would have to test the strength of the positions they had built against an enemy whose reputation had grown with every retreating column that had passed through their lines
Along the Bath Line, the sounds of the war drew ever closer. It was evident that German ground forces had now deployed well within artillery range of the Dutch positions. Yet, to the infantrymen manning the line, one aspect of the situation seemed particularly ominous: despite the enemy's proximity, not a single German artillery round was directed at the Bath Line. The silence was unsettling. What were the Germans preparing to do?
General Wodrig, commander of XXVI Army Corps, had decided to secure his left flank before committing forces into Zeeland. To that end, three battalions from the motorized SS-regiments Deutschland and Germania, heavily supported by the Luftwaffe, were deployed in western North Brabant. Their mission was to clear the area between Roosendaal, Bergen op Zoom, and Woensdrecht of Allied forces.
At Bergen op Zoom, elements of the French 12th Groupe de Reconnaissance de Division d'Infanterie (12e GRDI), and light cavalry troops of 6.RC (of 1.DLM), were commanded by the CO of a recce formation of the 6th RC, Major Michon. This officer had found himself in contact with German airbornes and Luftwaffe formations when he had tried to reconnoitre the strength of the German pocket at Moerdijk on the 11th. He had been ran off by German doing with considerable losses on his behalf. In Bergen op Zoon he found his formation surrounded by two companies of an SS battalion. The exact strength of the total French force present remains uncertain, but contemporary estimates suggest approximately 300-400 men, supported by around fourteen able Panhard P-178 armoured cars.
Meanwhile, a French tank detachment under Commandant Lestoquoi, equipped with roughly twenty Hotchkiss H-35 infantry support tanks, positioned near Woensdrecht, withdrew southwards. This retreat effectively sealed the fate of Michon's force at Bergen op Zoom. Once the Germans had cut the city off from the remainder of the French troops, Michon granted his men freedom of action. The measure proved ineffective. Most of the force surrendered with little resistance, and the Germans captured the entire contingent together with its fourteen armoured cars. It had not been an impressive French performance.
At Woensdrecht, two battalions of the SS Regiment Germania drove back the remaining French units with surprisingly little effort. Despite enjoying a numerical advantage, the French withdrew rapidly from the area, abandoning significant quantities of equipment, including tanks and vehicles. German after-action reports repeatedly expressed surprise at both the speed of the French retreat and the quantity of material captured.
A Dutch detachment of approximately 200 men under a Lieutenant-Colonel had meanwhile taken up positions in a wooded area south of Bergen op Zoom. The force had been ordered to hold its ground by Colonel De Beauchesne, commander of the 2e, 12e, and 27e GRDI formations and responsible for the rearguard defence of the French forces still operating in the Netherlands.
Only a few hours later, however, De Beauchesne and his staff relocated their headquarters southward into Belgium. As a result, the commander of the Allied forces in the sector was now situated some 25 kilometres away from the troops he nominally commanded.
Once again, the recurring problem of inadequate communication between the French and Dutch forces became apparent. The Dutch detachment was not informed of De Beauchesne's withdrawal. Later, when the sounds of battle echoed around their position and then gradually faded away, it became painfully clear that the French forces had disengaged and withdrawn without notifying them. The Dutch troops found themselves isolated and effectively abandoned.
Interestingly, the French author and eyewitness Lerecouvreux, in his account of the Seventh Army's operations, claimed that no Dutch troops had ever occupied the woodland position and that they had simply disappeared. This assertion is difficult to reconcile with Dutch records and testimony. It is, moreover, not the only questionable aspect of his Lerecouvreux narrative, which contains several inconsistencies when compared with other contemporary sources.
The events that unfolded in the south-western corner of North Brabant on 14 May were remarkable. A sizeable French force, supported by at least sixty light and medium tanks and several dozen armoured cars, yielded ground to a German force consisting of only four infantry battalions. These German units possessed no tanks and were supported by only a limited number of light and medium armoured cars.
The most determined French resistance occurred near Huijbergen, close to Woensdrecht, where elements of the 27th Groupe de Reconnaissance de Division d'Infanterie (27e GRDI) engaged a battalion of the SS Regiment Deutschland. Despite the availability of Panhard armoured cars and Hotchkiss tanks, the French were unable to halt the German advance. During the fighting they lost no less than five Panhard armoured cars and suffered the capture of approximately 200 men, while the Germans reported no significant matériel losses. The SS battalion continued its advance without interruption.
Elsewhere in the sector, hundreds of French soldiers - and a number of scattered Dutch detachments - were taken prisoner. Additional casualties were incurred, and large quantities of equipment were abandoned. German losses were comparatively light; the two SS regiments involved reported only ten men killed in action. By around midday, German forces had secured the entire south-western corner of North Brabant and captured a substantial quantity of Allied matériel, including hundreds of vehicles, armoured cars, and tanks.
The strategic consequences were considerable. By gaining control of the Scheldt approaches, the Germans effectively rendered the port of Antwerp unusable for Allied operations. The northern mission of the French Seventh Army had failed. North Brabant was now entirely in German hands, the mouth of the Scheldt had been lost, and vessels still present in Antwerp were effectively trapped.
Yet not all Dutch territory had fallen. Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, occupying the southern bank of the Western Scheldt, remained under allied control. Indeed, the western part of the region would continue to form part of the allied defensive line until late May. Only on 27 May would this last portion of Dutch soil finally be occupied by German forces.
Meanwhile, a conference concerning the situation in Zeeland was held at Dunkirk under the chairmanship of the French Admiral Jean Abrial. The defensive measures undertaken since 11 May were reviewed, and considerable dissatisfaction was expressed regarding the state of the defences on Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland. The participants concluded that the local commander, Général de Brigade Durand, should be relieved of his command. It was decided that Général de Brigade Marcel Emile Deslaurens, commander of the 60th Infantry Division, would assume responsibility for the sector from 16 May onward.
Deslaurens received explicit instructions to strengthen the defences of Walcheren and to hold the island for as long as possible. Despite the setbacks suffered in North Brabant, the French High Command had not yet abandoned its intention of retaining control of the coastal region north-west and west of Antwerp. The defence of Zeeland would therefore continue to occupy an important place in Allied planning, even as the wider campaign in the Low Countries approached its final stages.