In this section one finds a number of FAQ answered.
The Dutch armed forces lost approximately 2,300 men killed in action during the five-day campaign in the Netherlands, including the eight-day struggle in the province of Zeeland. The exact number of wounded is not known, but more than 7,000 Dutch servicemen received documented medical treatment for wounds sustained during the fighting. The actual number was higher, as many lightly wounded soldiers were never formally recorded.
The Dutch civilian death toll of the May 1940 campaign remains uncertain. One reason is that, in many cases, civilians who died during the period were not always clearly registered as war casualties, making precise reconstruction difficult. Estimates generally range between 1,150 and 1,300 civilian fatalities. The single most devastating incident was the German air raid on Rotterdam on 14 May 1940, which claimed between 700 and 800 lives. Other major incidents included the accidental bombing of Amsterdam on 11 May, which caused 44 civilian deaths, and operational air raids on locations such as Alblasserdam and Zevenbergen, where dozens more civilians were killed.
Compared with many other campaigns of the Second World War, civilian losses in the Netherlands remained relatively limited. One important reason was that many areas near the principal defence lines had been evacuated before major ground combat commenced, reducing the number of civilians exposed to direct military action.
German losses during the campaign were remarkably similar. The counted number of documented killed German servicemen (officially registered as killed in action) is 2,132 (@2025), although the true figure may have been somewhat higher. Additional victims (linked to the Dutch theatre) are still found in archives every year.
The number of German wounded remains uncertain. Applying the commonly accepted casualty ratio of one killed for every 3.5 to 4 wounded suggests that German losses may have included between 7,000 and 8,000 wounded personnel.
The Dutch also succeeded in transferring approximately 1,300 German prisoners of war to the United Kingdom. These men were effectively lost to Germany for the remainder of the war. Most of them were Luftwaffe personnel, Fallschirmjäger (airbornes), and air-landed infantry of the 22nd Infantry Division captured during the fighting around The Hague and other sectors of the airborne campaign.
French losses in the Netherlands amounted to at least 216 confirmed fatalities, whilst a number of 229 goes round too. Of these, 62 were documented as killed in North Brabant and 154 documented as KIA in Zeeland.
The number of French wounded remains unknown, as does the exact number of prisoners of war. Figures of approximately 800 French wounded are occasionally cited in secondary sources, but these estimates have not yet been substantiated by reliable documentary evidence. Likewise, some estimates suggest that around 3,000 French soldiers were captured in the Netherlands between 10 and 18 May 1940. These figures are equally unverified and may well underestimate the true number of French prisoners taken during the campaign.
In May 1940, the Dutch Army had approximately 280,000 men under arms. Foreign sources often cite figures of 350,000 to 400,000, but these numbers are incorrect and substantially overstated.
The Dutch Army itself numbered about 240,000 men, with a further 40,000 serving in related branches and formations, including the Army Air Force, coastal artillery defences, and volunteer units. The Royal Netherlands Navy and Marine Corps in the Netherlands accounted for approximately another 10,000 men, but these are not included in the 280,000 figure.
The Dutch Army was only partly organised into field army formations. Foreign sources often mention only the principal field army units: eight infantry divisions, organised into four army corps, one independent 'Peel Division', and one light mobile division (the 'Light Division'). In addition to these large formations, however, there were three field army brigades (A, B, and G) together with the regiments in the Fortress Army and approximately thirty independent border infantry battalions and companies.
The Fortress Army had no divisional structure. It was organised instead into companies, battalions, and regiments. This force occupied the defences of Fortress Holland and the province of Zeeland and consisted largely of older reservists but quite a considerable number of its regiments had been 'borrowed' by the Field Army formations, like the three Brigades which were almost entirely composed of Fortress Army regiments.
The Dutch Army comprised 48 infantry regiments, each numbering approximately 2,200 to 2,500 men; 24 independent border infantry battalions of roughly 500-700 men each; a number of border infantry companies; and two regiments of bicycle infantry. It also included two regiments of motorcycle infantry and six cavalry regiments, partly mounted on horseback and partly on bicycles with fully motorised support.
The artillery arm (not counting the coastal and navy artillery, nor the anti air artillery) consisted of fifteen independent artillery regiments of three battalions each, four independent artillery regiments of two battalions each, and eight independent artillery battalions. The total number of active artillery pieces was 692, excluding obsolete 8-staal guns, 6-veld guns, and anti-tank guns. The gun to personnel ratio met the average of most peer armies of 1:400 [280,000 : 692 = 404].
Alongside these combat formations, the Army contained a substantial number of support units, including engineers, pioneers, logistics formations, medical troops, and other service branches.
The Army Air Force had about 135 airplanes operational for active duty. This is not counting obsolete recce planes, artillery spotter planes, and training and schooling outfits. The Naval Air Arm had another lot of floater planes for coastal defence (torpedo planes) and recce.
For further details, reference is made to the Introduction chapter of this website.
The German Army - Das Heer - assigned the 18th Army to the Dutch theatre. This formation consisted of X Corps, comprising two infantry divisions, the attached motorised SS-Leibstandarte and the attached SS-Standarte Der Führer, and one occupation division of approximately brigade strength; XXVI Corps, comprising four ready and two reserve divisions, included one armoured division (9th Panzer Division) and the attached SS-Verfügungstruppe Division (of which the SS-Der Führer had been detached to X Corps); and the independent 1st Cavalry Division.
The Luftwaffe contributed the 7th Air Corps (VII. Fliegerkorps), consisting of the two-regiment 7th Airborne Division and the 22nd Airlanding Infantry Division, reinforced by a battalion of Infantry Regiment 72 as a operational reserve. The strength of the 7th Air Corps landing forces was significantly lower than their total strength. They comprised both a Air-lifted and Airborne Formation (Fliegende Staffel) and a rear force (Erd Staffel) that would traditionally be transported in by foot or whatever wheeled transportation available. Only the Fliegende Staffel was planned to land, which it would only partially achieve. This added up to around 4,000 men of the Airbornes and around 11,000 men of the Air Lifted troops, of which in total probably only 12,000 would actually land.
The 18th Army itself numbered approximately 180,000 men, excluding rear services in the motherland. The Luftwaffe added a significant portion to that. The combined actually landed airlanding force had an operational strength of about 12,000 men: roughly 3,500 paratroopers and 8,500 airlanding troops.
During the first two days of the invasion, two divisions of the German 6th Army covered the left flank of XXVI Corps in North Brabant. In addition, the bulk of the 6th Army crossed the southeastern Dutch province of Limburg. On the first day, some of its units engaged the few Dutch battalions defending the Meuse sector in Limburg. Although these formations represented a significant force, they should not be counted as part of the invasion force assigned to the Dutch theatre, as their primary objective was the invasion of Belgium.
Overall, the German ground forces directly committed against the Netherlands numbered approximately 200,000 men, including General Student's airlanding corps but excluding rear services and later added Army reserves.
The Dutch Commander-in-Chief was General Henri G. Winkelman, who exercised overall command of the Dutch Army, Army Air Force, and Royal Netherlands Navy within the homeland. He had been appointed Commander-in-Chief in February 1940, succeeding General I.H. Reynders, who was dismissed in January 1940 following a dispute with the Dutch government over national defence strategy.
The Commander of the Field Army was Lieutenant-General J.J.G. (Baron) van Voorst tot Voorst. His younger brother, Major-General H.F.M. (Baron) van Voorst tot Voorst, served as Chief of the General Staff.
The other Dutch commanders of interest were:
The four Dutch Army Corps were commanded by:
The German commander responsible for operations against the Netherlands was General der Artillerie Georg von Küchler, commander of the German 18th Army. His immediate superior was Generaloberst Fedor von Bock, commander of Army Group B.
The airborne operations conducted by the VII Fliegerkorps, under Generalleutnant Kurt Student, were planned and directed by the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe under Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring. Operational command of Luftwaffe activities over the Netherlands rested with Generaloberst Albert Kesselring, commander of Luftflotte 2.
Among the principal German field commanders involved in the campaign were:
Together, these commanders directed the German invasion force that overwhelmed the Netherlands in just five days and played a central role in the opening phase of Fall Gelb, the German offensive in Western Europe.
International law, primarily as codified in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, was binding upon and generally respected by all belligerents operating in the Netherlands during the May 1940 campaign.
As in most conflicts, however, violations did occur. Both Dutch and German sources recorded incidents involving breaches of the laws of war by the opposing side, and evidence exists that soldiers of both armies occasionally committed infractions. Individual prisoners of war were sometimes mistreated, assaulted, or even summarily executed. Likewise, a number of incidents were recorded in which the white flag of truce or the Red Cross emblem was misused.
There was, however, one notable exception in which the laws of war appear to have been violated on a much broader scale. This concerns the conduct of the SS Regiment Der Führer (later renamed "Das Reich") during the three-day Battle of the Grebbeberg. Substantial evidence indicates that the laws and customs of war were poorly observed during the SS operations of 11 - 13 May 1940. Numerous reports describe the killing of prisoners, massacres in captured trench systems - particularly on 11 May - the systematic mistreatment of prisoners of war, and the repeated use of captured Dutch soldiers as human shields against Dutch defensive fire.
The number and consistency of these reports strongly suggest that such practices were not merely isolated incidents. The estimated Dutch death toll resulting from these violations ranges between 35 and 60 men. The broad range is largely due to allegations concerning the execution of a group of approximately two dozen Dutch prisoners. While the available evidence points strongly towards an SS-perpetrated massacre, definitive proof remains lacking.
No comparable pattern of abuse has been documented with regard to the French forces operating in the Netherlands. The only recurring complaints concerned the looting of civilian property by French and Belgian troops. Such incidents were reported on numerous occasions, particularly in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen.
Indeed, looting appears to have been more common among Dutch, Belgian, and French troops than among German forces. German units generally maintained strict discipline in this regard. A number of documented cases show German soldiers being subjected to severe disciplinary measures for looting, including, in at least a few instances, the death penalty.
Overall, the laws of war were respected by most combatants throughout the campaign. There are even documented cases of considerable courtesy between opposing officers, especially among career officers of the German Army, who often displayed a traditional and professional attitude towards their adversaries.
Claims that the German Army systematically violated the laws of war throughout the Netherlands campaign are not supported by the available evidence and most likely not justified. While serious violations undoubtedly occurred - most notably during the fighting at the Grebbeberg - they were not characteristic of German operations in the Netherlands as a whole.
One of the most frequently debated issues concerning the conduct of the May 1940 campaign is the German air raid on Rotterdam.
The large-scale bombing of Rotterdam on 14 May 1940 is often described as a blatant violation of international law. Such claims - most commonly advanced by Dutch and British historians - are frequently influenced by moral and emotional considerations and are often insufficiently substantiated from a legal perspective. Under the international law in force in May 1940, an air attack against a defended city like Rotterdam was, in principle, permissible. Certain aspects of the raid, however, may indeed be regarded as minor or serious violations of the laws and customs of war, particularly regarding adequate warning procedures and the indiscriminate destruction of protected buildings and civilian property.
Rotterdam was a defended city and had significant geo-strategic importance to both sides. As such, the German armed forces were entitled to attack the Dutch defensive perimeter. This right included the use of artillery and aerial bombardment against military objectives within the city.
Critics of the raid generally advance three principal arguments:
(a) the indiscriminate nature of the bombardment, which devastated large civilian areas of the city;
(b) the fact that the attack was carried out while surrender negotiations were still in progress; and
(c) the excessively short deadline contained in the German ultimatum.
The first argument, concerning the indiscriminate nature of the bombardment, has considerable merit. The destruction of churches, schools, hospitals, and other protected structures was contrary to the spirit and, arguably, the letter of the Hague Conventions. At the same time, the conventions had been drafted before the advent of large-scale strategic air warfare and did not adequately address the realities of modern aerial bombardment. In this respect, the Rotterdam raid may be considered a violation of the provisions intended to protect religious, educational, charitable, and medical institutions.
However, it should also be noted that the Second World War quickly rendered many of these restrictions largely ineffective. All major belligerents would eventually conduct large-scale area bombardments that resulted in extensive destruction of protected buildings and civilian districts. The argument that Germany was the first to employ such methods is therefore open to debate. Prior to the war, British planners had already examined the possibility of large-scale bombing campaigns against industrial targets in the Ruhr, although such plans were not implemented, primarily for political reasons and out of concern for retaliation against British and French cities. Later in the war, both Germany and the Allies would engage in extensive area bombing campaigns against urban centres.
The second argument - the continuation of the attack while negotiations were underway - is arguably the strongest legal criticism of the Rotterdam raid. Evidence suggests that responsibility for this decision lay not with the local German commanders but with the Luftwaffe high command. Despite being aware that surrender negotiations were taking place, Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring is said to have insisted that the bombing operation proceed. Attempts by some historians to explain the raid solely as a consequence of communication failures overlook the fact that senior Luftwaffe authorities possessed knowledge of the ongoing negotiations before the bombers reached their targets. The successful recall of a second wave of bombers later that day further demonstrates that communication with the attacking aircraft was, at least in some circumstances, possible.
The third criticism concerns the ultimatum itself. Most military and legal specialists agree that the deadline granted to the Dutch defenders was unreasonably short. Contemporary interpretations of the laws of war generally required a substantially longer period - often between twelve and twenty-four hours - before the commencement of such a large bombardment. Critics often argue that this denied the civilian population sufficient opportunity to evacuate.
Yet this argument should be viewed within its broader context. During the preceding four days of fighting, the Dutch authorities had themselves refrained from organising a large-scale evacuation of Rotterdam. They feared that large refugee movements would interfere with military operations and logistics. Given the city’s strategic importance and the ongoing German air activity, an evacuation was certainly a conceivable option, particularly in light of the experiences of Guernica in 1937 and Warsaw in 1939. Nevertheless, Dutch authorities judged the risks of mass civilian movement to outweigh the potential benefits. Consequently, responsibility for the limited evacuation opportunities cannot be attributed solely to the Germans.
One may therefore conclude that the German authorities did not fully comply with all aspects of the laws and customs of war during the Rotterdam operation. Certain elements of the raid may indeed be considered violations of international law. However, the legal case is more complex than is often suggested, and the raid cannot easily be categorised as the unequivocal and straightforward war crime it is sometimes portrayed to be.
A related issue concerns the destruction of the historic centre of Middelburg on 17 May 1940. For many years, this destruction was attributed entirely to German artillery and air attacks. More recent historical research has challenged this interpretation. Evidence indicates that French long-range artillery, supporting the evacuation of Allied forces from Walcheren, heavily shelled the Middelburg area. French shell fragments were recovered from the city after the war, and both heavy and lighter-calibre French munitions have been identified among the debris. While German actions undoubtedly contributed to the destruction, there is increasing evidence that French artillery played a far more significant role than was long assumed, and may well have been primarily responsible for the loss of Middelburg's historic city centre.
The Netherlands used a rather unusual time standard in 1940. Official Dutch time was known as Amsterdam Time (more accurately Gorinchem Time), based on the local meridian running through the central Netherlands. This time standard was 20 minutes ahead of Greenwich Mean Time (GMT).
German forces used Central European Time (CET), which was one hour ahead of GMT and therefore 40 minutes ahead of Dutch time.
France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom all used the same basic time standard based on GMT. By May 1940, however, France, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom had already adopted summer time (daylight saving time). The Netherlands had not yet done so.
On 10 May 1940, the Netherlands was still operating on Amsterdam Time, while the other belligerents had already advanced their clocks by one hour. The introduction of Dutch summer time was scheduled for 16 May 1940, but events overtook the calendar.
As a result, time references in Dutch sources from the first days of the campaign differ significantly from those found in German, British, French, and Belgian records.
The corresponding times on 10 May 1940 were therefore:
Netherlands || Germany || United Kingdom || France || Belgium
12:00 hrs || 13:40 hrs || 12:40 hrs || 12:40 hrs || 12:40 hrs
Researchers comparing operational reports from different nations should always take these differences into account. Failure to convert times correctly can easily create apparent discrepancies in the chronology of events, particularly during the opening hours of the campaign when Dutch, German, French, Belgian, and British sources are frequently used side by side.
In 1935 and 1936, the Dutch Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General I.H. Reynders, compiled a comprehensive list of requirements for the rapid modernisation of the Dutch Army's arsenal. Among the many items identified as urgently needed were both light and medium tanks. In 1937, the final inventory of requirements was submitted to the Minister of Defence and included a minimum requirement of 65 light tanks, 36 medium tanks, and 51 armoured cars.
Although the Dutch defence budget had already been increased in 1937, it was still considered insufficient to finance the extensive modernisation programme proposed by the General Staff. The procurement of tanks was therefore postponed.
Budgetary considerations were only part of the reason. Equally influential was an unusual advisory memorandum submitted by the senior military official of the Ministry of Defence, Major of the General Staff A.Q.H. Dyxhoorn, who would become Minister of Defence in 1939. Attached to the Chief of Staff's proposal was Dyxhoorn's personal assessment that tanks should be regarded as weapons of the previous war. Drawing upon developments in anti-tank weaponry and observations from the Spanish Civil War - particularly the poor performance of early German Panzer I and Italian CV-33 tanks - he argued that the future of the tank was already in doubt.
History would prove him spectacularly wrong.
Nevertheless, his views were well received within the Ministry of Defence, which was already struggling to reconcile the military's extensive demands with political and financial realities. The proposed procurement programme was far more ambitious than the government was prepared to support, and Dyxhoorn's assessment provided a convenient justification for postponing the acquisition of tanks.
As a result, tanks disappeared from the Ministry's procurement agenda. The military establishment, however, did not abandon the issue. Army planners argued that once the acquisition of armoured cars had been completed - which resulted in the procurement of 14 Swedish Landsverk L-180 armoured cars and twenty-four Dutch DAF Pantrado M.39/M.40 vehicles, in addition to the 12 armoured vehicles [Landsverk L-181] already in service - light tanks should become the next priority.
To explore the matter further, the Army approached the Swedish manufacturer Landsverk to inquire whether two examples of its L-60 light tank could be supplied. The 8.3-ton vehicle, armed with a 37 mm Bofors gun, was intended primarily for training purposes, enabling infantry and anti-tank units to gain practical experience against armoured vehicles. Once again, however, the Ministry rejected the proposal.
At the same time, the Dutch manufacturer DAF was asked whether it could develop a tank variant based on the successful M.39 Pantrado armoured car design. DAF responded positively and prepared a quotation for the development and construction of two prototype tanks. Yet this proposal met the same fate. By then, Dyxhoorn had even become Minister of Defence himself and continued to regard tanks as a low-priority weapon system. Consequently, the introduction of tanks into the Dutch Army was postponed once more.
Meanwhile, the Royal Netherlands East-Indies Army (KNIL) had already embraced armoured warfare, although it largely missed the landscape to serve it. It not only operated a few tanks already but had also placed substantial orders - amounting to roughly 600 vehicles - with foreign manufacturers such as Vickers and even the quite ill reputed manufacturer Marmon-Herrington.
Few examples illustrate more clearly the influence that a single minister could exert on military policy. As a consequence, only one tank ever served with the Dutch Army before the outbreak of the Second World War. In the late 1920s, a single Renault FT-17, a First World War design, had been acquired for the sole purpose of testing anti-tank obstacles, inundation schemes, and defensive barriers. Its role was purely experimental and intended to assess the vulnerability of Dutch defensive works to armoured attack.
By May 1940, this solitary tank had long since been withdrawn from active use. Its exact whereabouts at the time of the German invasion remain unknown.