Although Allied air support was sorely lacking over Zuid-Beveland and Walcheren during the morning hours of the 16th, French and British aircraft remained highly active in the wider area between Breda and Antwerp.
During one of these operations, a German Dornier Do 17 was intercepted and shot down at approximately 1400 hours in the area between Woensdrecht and Terneuzen. According to German records, the aircraft was attacked by three French Morane-Saulnier MS.406 fighters. All four members of the German crew survived the crash and were subsequently taken prisoner.
Earlier that morning, and again later in the evening, Handley Page Hampden bombers from several RAF squadrons carried out a series of attacks against the road network around Breda and Roosendaal. These raids formed part of the continuing Allied effort to disrupt German troop movements and logistical traffic in the region.
German casualty records indicate personnel losses in Roosendaal on both 15 and 16 May. Since major ground combat in the area had effectively ceased after 14 May, it is quite possible that these casualties resulted from the Allied air attacks. While the strategic impact of the raids appears to have been limited, they nevertheless demonstrated that Allied air forces continued to contest German freedom of movement behind the front lines.
The operations also reflected a broader pattern during this phase of the campaign. Although the Luftwaffe generally maintained air superiority over the battlefield, French and British aircraft continued to mount frequent interdiction and reconnaissance missions wherever opportunities presented themselves. In the skies over the southern Netherlands, the air war remained active even as the ground campaign was rapidly approaching its conclusion.
The Dutch commander-in-chief in Zeeland, Rear Admiral (lower half) Van der Stad, received instructions from the Dutch government in London directing him to do everything within his power to avoid falling into German hands. Van der Stad felt somewhat uncomfortable with these orders. He feared that leaving Walcheren might be perceived by his subordinates as abandoning a sinking ship, like he had witnessed when news broke of the evacuated Government and Royal Family a few days earlier. Concerned about the implications of such a move, he discussed the matter with the French Vice Admiral Platon. The French officer advised him to comply with the government's instructions. From the French perspective, the departure of the Dutch commander was unlikely to have any significant impact on the military situation, as the Dutch contribution to the defence of Zeeland had by then diminished considerably.
After consulting with his senior staff, Van der Stad decided to relocate his headquarters to Breskens in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. Before departing, he instructed his artillery commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Karel, to oversee the day-to-day affairs of the headquarters. Significantly, however, he did not formally transfer command authority to him.
On the one hand, this decision was understandable. Van der Stad was not abandoning the theatre altogether; he was merely moving his command post to another part of Zeeland. On the other hand, the officers and staff who remained in Middelburg were left without a clear mandate to make independent operational decisions. They were expected to continue functioning, yet lacked the authority required to respond effectively to rapidly changing circumstances whilst the communication lines with Breskens were vulnerable or absent.
Even given the increasingly limited role of the Dutch armed forces on Walcheren, this arrangement created a number of practical difficulties. The absence of a clearly designated successor left the Dutch command structure uncertain and cumbersome at a time when decisive leadership was most needed. The consequences of this ambiguous command situation would become particularly apparent the following day, when confusion and delays within the Dutch chain of command contributed to an increasingly chaotic situation on Walcheren.
The Dutch gunboat Hr.Ms. Flores departed for Dunkirk on 16 May, after sustaining minor damage and requiring an urgent degaussing treatment. The decision to leave was taken on the initiative of her commanding officer. When Rear Admiral Van der Stad learned of the vessel's departure, he immediately ordered her to return. The order, however, was ignored, and the Flores continued on her course. The following day, the gunboat would play a rather remarkable role in the events unfolding around Zeeland.
The large Dutch minelayer Hr.Ms. Van Meerlant had already sailed for Belgian Ostend at 0315 hours with the intention of replenishing her fuel supplies. Like the Flores, she was subsequently ordered to return. Her captain likewise chose to disregard these instructions and continued his voyage.
Upon reaching the Belgian coast, however, it became apparent that Ostend could no longer be entered safely. Consequently, the vessel altered course and proceeded to Dunkirk instead, where she successfully replenished her fuel and other supplies.
For the Royal Netherlands Navy, an institution renowned for its discipline, professionalism, and strict adherence to the chain of command, these incidents were highly unusual. The Dutch naval service remained deeply traditional in character, and disobedience of direct orders by commanding officers was exceedingly rare.
The decisions taken by the captains of both vessels therefore carried a significance beyond their immediate operational circumstances. They reflected the growing sense that the Dutch military position in the homeland was rapidly disintegrating and command had lost oversight and control. Communications had become uncertain, command structures increasingly fragmented, and confidence in the prospects of continued resistance had been severely undermined by recent events.
In that context, the actions of the two naval commanders may be viewed as an indication that the final remnants of organised Dutch resistance in the Netherlands were beginning to unravel. The authority of the Dutch military leadership still formally existed, but its practical ability to direct events was steadily diminishing. As the situation in Zeeland deteriorated, individual commanders increasingly found themselves making decisions based on their own assessment of circumstances rather than on instructions from higher authority - a clear symptom of an armed force approaching the end of its campaign.