The French played a crucial role in the events that unfolded in the southern Netherlands during the May Campaign of 1940. Whatever conclusions may be drawn regarding their overall performance, the French contribution deserves careful examination and assessment.
Prior to the German invasion, intelligence services were already aware that the French Field Army forces would advance northward in the event of a German attack. Even before obtaining direct evidence of elements of the French defensive plans, the German High Command had assumed that France intended to commit substantial forces to Belgium. German planners believed that the French would seek to confront the German offensive on Belgian territory, using Belgium as a buffer to protect France itself - a strategy that closely resembled the French approach during the First World War.
By February 1940, the Germans had become convinced that the French would attempt to secure Antwerp and prevent a German advance into Belgium from the northwest. This assessment was reinforced by intelligence gathered from intercepted and decrypted French communications. Following the crash of a German Bf-108 aircraft in Belgium in January 1940, which exposed elements of the contempory German invasion plans, French military communications increased markedly. Belgian border actions, clearing road blocks on the Franco-Belgian border, confirmed the picture. Analysis of these messages and events confirmed what German intelligence had already suspected: in the event of war, substantial French forces would advance into Belgium. These findings were considered highly valuable by the German Abwehr, and the staffs responsible for refining Fall Gelb (Case Yellow) welcomed the intelligence with great enthusiasm. And so did Hitler himself, who used the events to force his Generals into change.
As a consequence of the events, the Germans revised their strategic plans. The revised strategy relied heavily on the expectation that both the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and the French Army would move deep into Belgium. The Manstein Plan, which ultimately formed the basis of the final version of Fall Gelb, was built on the assumption that the BEF would immediately advance into Belgium, followed by at least two French armies.
The German Fourth and Sixth Armies were tasked with drawing the Allied forces into central Belgium and fixing them there. A honey-pot trap. Meanwhile, the Eighteenth Army in the north and the Twelfth Army in the south were instructed to advance rapidly toward the Channel coast.
The Twelfth Army, in particular, was assigned the most demanding task. After advancing through the Ardennes and breaking through the Allied defences in the Dinant–Sedan sector, it was to drive swiftly westward toward the Channel in a vast sweeping movement. The objective was to outpace Allied decision-making, sever the connection between the Allied armies in Belgium and the French heartland, and trap the northern Allied forces in a giant encirclement. To ensure success, the Twelfth Army was supported by powerful Luftwaffe formations and included five Panzer divisions, with two additional armoured divisions operating on its right flank.
In this context, the advance of the BEF and the expected French Armies deep into Belgium was not merely anticipated by the Germans - it was an essential prerequisite for the success of the Manstein Plan. Although the Germans remained uncertain of the merits of the Anglo-French plans, they anticipated the essence that formidable forces would penetrate Belgium upon a German invasion of the Low Countries. This theory was practised and proven during countless war games, the outcome of which led to many tweaks and changes to shape the starting grid leading up to the May 1940 invasion.
The French Seventh Army was, on paper, an impressive formation, commanded by one of France's most highly regarded generals: Henri Giraud. The army consisted of five infantry divisions, two of them motorised, together with an attached armoured division equipped with light and medium tanks and an armoured reconnaissance brigade. An additional tank brigade was later attached as reinforcement. Most of these formations possessed only modest artillery and light anti-aircraft assets. At a later stage, another infantry division - the 68th Infantry Division - was added to the Seventh Army, although it operated under the naval authority of Amiral Nord (Platon).
The French Army had no special interest in the Dutch cause as such. Its objectives were primarily French and Allied strategic ones but that in itself involved deploying formations on Dutch soil. First, Antwerp had to be safeguarded by forming a defensive screen around the Scheldt. Secondly, the French deployment was intended to close the northern approaches into Belgium, in conjunction with Belgian troops holding the defensive lines south of the Dutch border. Thirdly, by placing French forces on both flanks of the Belgian KW Line, Gamelin hoped to bring the Belgian commander-in-chief into closer alignment with French strategic direction.
In a later phase of the campaign, the northern deployment of substantial French forces was also intended to create the conditions for a possible counteroffensive against Germany's industrial heartland. Gamelin considered northern Belgium and the southern Netherlands suitable terrain from which such an operation might eventually be launched, once the German offensive had been halted.
That these objectives brought French troops partly onto Dutch soil did not reflect any particular desire to assist the Netherlands for its own sake. The French had one principal objective in the Netherlands: to establish a screen around the Scheldt, taking positions behind the Dutch river Mark, possibly extended by a forward defensive position east of Breda.
The Dutch defence of southeastern North Brabant did contribute to French planning, and this forced the French to coordinate with Dutch forces once their first major units entered the Netherlands on 10 and 11 May. Yet this was not the kind of integrated command and control one might expect between allies with genuinely intertwined interests. It was, rather, a form of coordination in which the French expected Dutch forces to conform to French tactical requirements.
When the first French troops arrived in the Netherlands, they were soon approached by the Dutch Territorial Commander (TC), a Colonel, who made every effort to coordinate Dutch operations with those of the newly arrived ally. Unfortunately, the French command structure itself appeared to suffer from a lack of consistency. Each meeting with French officers seemed to produce new instructions, revised plans, or conflicting information.
Once it became clear that the Peel-Raam Line had been breached, French interest in Dutch operations declined rapidly. The French increasingly focused on their own strategic requirements and began planning independently of Dutch participation or interests. Dutch authorities were rarely consulted thereafter, and when coordination did occur, it was usually at Dutch initiative rather than French. One notable exception was the French decision to order the evacuation of Breda.
Nevertheless, a number of Franco-Dutch cooperative actions did take place. The most significant were the evacuation of Breda on 12 May and the limited operations around Moerdijk on 11 May. Significantly, both actions directly served French operational interests. The evacuation of Breda was linked to the continued importance of the Dyle–Breda concept and the desire to establish a strong defensive position around the city. The Moerdijk operation, meanwhile, was initially driven by the requirement to secure safe passage for a liaison officer party (led by Général Mittelhauser) from the French General Headquarters (Grand Quartier Général, GQG) to The Hague.
The events at Moerdijk are particularly illustrative. The first French detachment of 6.RC to arrive in the area, under Major Michon, showed little inclination to attack the German bridgehead or confer with the Dutch troops in situ. Its primary mission appears to have been reconnaissance and the establishment of situational awareness in this strategically important sector. Only after Lieutenant Martin arrived escorting General Eugène Mittelhauser did Major Michon decide to launch an attack on Moerdijk. Even then, the operation was undertaken without adequate prior coordination with the Dutch forces in the area.
Further attempts at cooperation followed around Bergen op Zoom and in the Roosendaal sector, but these were generally poorly coordinated. In several instances, French commanders issued instructions to Dutch units and subsequently altered their plans without informing them. Dutch commanders often discovered these changes only after the fact. Similarly, efforts to establish a coordinated defensive line east and north of Tilburg failed. The Dutch were unable to fulfil their assigned role, while the French withdrew before significant combat had taken place.
The overall picture is one of ineffective and often dysfunctional cooperation between the two allies.
Responsibility for this state of affairs rested largely with the French command, which appears to have lost much of its interest in close coordination once the Peel-Raam Line had collapsed. Yet it would be unfair to place all responsibility on the French side.
The Dutch decision to withdraw the main field formations from North Brabant was almost certainly viewed with frustration by French officers operating in the Dutch theatre. Although General Gamelin was made aware of Dutch strategic intentions, many French commanders in the field appear not to have been properly informed by their superiors. As a result, they were confronted with the consequences of Dutch policy without having been prepared for them.
More fundamentally, the Dutch High Command failed to make adequate preparations for joint operations with French forces in the south. One of the enduring mysteries of the campaign is why General Winkelman and his staff neglected to establish a dedicated liaison organisation for cooperation with the French, on every operational level. The highest officer in theater was a Colonel. Equally puzzling is the apparent failure to assign French-speaking officers to key formations expected to operate alongside French troops, such as the units defending the Peel-Raam Line, the 3rd and 6th Border Infantry Battalions, and the Territorial Command. But also the failure to provide liaison parties to attach to French and Allied staffs higher up in the operational tree. This caused the Dutch to be totally absent in the operational chain of command of the Anglo-French and Belgian forces.
This omission represented a serious weakness in command and control arrangements - as well as in awareness of the state of affairs on the battlefield when the campaign progressed. Its importance is often underestimated, yet it had a direct impact on the effectiveness of Allied cooperation in the field but it also worked out in poor Dutch decision making regarding the theater in the south of the country and the breached Fortress Holland at Moerdijk. The deficiency is particularly striking because the Dutch Army possessed a considerable number of officers who spoke French fluently and could have been assigned to these critical liaison roles.
In retrospect, the failure to establish an effective liaison structure was one of the most significant Dutch shortcomings in the preparation of joint operations with the French Army. It contributed materially to the misunderstandings, delays, and coordination problems that characterised Franco-Dutch cooperation during the campaign
The operational performance of the French Seventh Army during the campaign in the Netherlands was deeply disappointing. Despite its impressive strength on paper, General Giraud's army repeatedly failed to establish and maintain a coherent defensive front. On several occasions, French formations abandoned positions after only limited contact with German forces, often before a major engagement had developed.
This pattern was evident throughout North Brabant. South of Tilburg and later around Bergen op Zoom, French units possessed a considerable advantage in armoured strength, including medium tanks and armoured reconnaissance vehicles. Yet even in these circumstances, they withdrew rapidly in the face of relatively modest German pressure. At Bergen op Zoom, for example, French forces that had tanks at their disposal retreated despite facing no German tanks whatsoever. The operation at Moerdijk - the one French action that held direct significance for the Dutch defence effort - was no exception. Across North Brabant, French units repeatedly disengaged without offering sustained resistance.
A notable exception in Brabant occurred near Ginneken, south of Breda, where a French company successfully held a German force at bay during the night of 12 - 13 May. And perhaps even the resistance put up by 4.RDP (of 1.DLM) to the east and south of Tilburg may qualify as meritorious. Apart from these two local actions, French resistance in North Brabant was generally brief and ineffective, while the losses of men and material to the Germans were significant.
The disappointing performance of the Seventh Army was not confined to the Netherlands. Throughout the campaign, the army largely avoided major engagements, both north and south of the Belgian border. Its formations were repeatedly shifted from one sector to another, often without a clear operational objective. Rather than seeking opportunities to engage the enemy under favourable conditions, the army appeared primarily concerned with maintaining organisational control and avoiding encirclement.
Ironically, this tendency had been identified before the campaign by General Gamelin himself. During the winter of 1939 - 1940, he reportedly expressed concern that several of his senior commanders - including Georges, Billotte, and Giraud - placed excessive emphasis on administrative control and caution, while showing insufficient willingness to exploit operational opportunities. In many respects, the conduct of the Seventh Army during the campaign appeared to confirm these concerns.
The final French forces withdrew from North Brabant after the unsuccessful defence of the Bergen op Zoom sector on 14 May. Here again, the contrast between French strength and German pressure was striking. More than one hundred French medium tanks and armoured cars were available in the Bergen op Zoom–Woensdrecht area, yet these forces were driven back by only two battalions of the SS Regiment Deutschland, supported by only a small number of armoured cars and no tanks whatsoever.
The French withdrawal was carried out in such haste that substantial quantities of heavy equipment, including artillery pieces, vehicles, and tanks, were abandoned. German reports from the period suggest genuine surprise at the ease with which these positions were taken. The German commanders had anticipated far more determined resistance and were astonished by the relatively limited fighting that accompanied their advance.
Meanwhile, Zeeland had also received French reinforcements. These consisted mainly of two of the weaker divisions of the French Army: the 60th and 68th Infantry Divisions. Both formations (B-Type divisions) were largely composed of older reservists and were equipped with ageing, often obsolete matériel. Even so, they brought with them additional artillery and light anti-aircraft weapons.
The first senior French officer to exercise authority over the land forces in Zeeland was Brigadier-General Durand, who had been assigned by the French General Headquarters (Grand Quartier Général, GQG) as commander-in-chief of the land formations on the islands of Walcheren en Zuid-Beveland. Durand did not distinguish himself in a positive way. He quickly frustrated the senior Dutch officers in Zeeland and behaved in a stubborn and conceited manner, showing little respect for his Dutch counterparts. When he failed to deploy the French troops effectively, and fellow officers complained about him, he was relieved of his command by his superior, Admiral Platon. That decision had already been taken in Dunkirk on 14 May, but was not implemented until the morning of 16 May, following a meeting of the French commanders the previous evening. Durand would later serve the Vichy regime as a secretary of state.
Admiral Charles Platon (1886–1944) commanded the French naval and air forces operating in Zeeland. From the outset, he proved himself a genuine ally. His contacts with Rear Admiral (lower half) Van der Stad, commander of the Dutch forces in Zeeland, were cordial and respectful. Platon coordinated French naval operations in a professional manner and fulfilled the expectations the Dutch might reasonably have had of an ally before the war. Although he distinguished himself in May 1940, Platon later became a prominent Vichy figure and eventually served as Minister of the Colonies under Marshal Pétain. As a zealous opponent of the Resistance, he was captured during the French purge and killed in particularly brutal circumstances.
On Walcheren, Brigadier-General Marcel Deslaurens (1883–1940), who was commanding the 60th Infantry Division, replaced Durand on 16 May. Deslaurens proved to be both capable and honourable. After the French withdrew into Walcheren - following the rapid German overrunning of the Dutch defensive lines on Zuid-Beveland and the collapse of the French positions along the canal - he attempted to establish a new defensive line along the Sloe in front of Middelburg. His troops, however, were exhausted, and no coherent defence could be organised, although they managed to repel two German assaults, yet succumbed to the third one.
Once Deslaurens' men were driven back at the Sloedam, the position became untenable. The French were ordered to withdraw towards Flushing for evacuation to Zeeuws-Vlaanderen. Deslaurens personally took charge of organising the defence against the pursuing SSVerfügungstruppen units. In doing so, he displayed considerable courage and resolve. During the final fighting in the streets of Flushing, that he took part in himself, he was killed by a fatal shot to the head.
To this day, Deslaurens is remembered in Zeeland as a hero. He was an exceptional figure: courageous, constructive in his dealings with Dutch military and civil authorities, and willing to lead from the front. Unfortunately, he was also a rare example of French command conduct that stood out positively during a campaign in which the French Army as a whole failed to impress either its Dutch allies or its German opponents. German officers later remarked that they preferred fighting the better-equipped French to the poorly equipped Dutch - although that judgement can hardly have applied to the Dutch troops who fought in Zeeland.
It would be wrong to exaggerate the French failures in North Brabant and Zeeland, for these shortcomings ultimately had little influence on the final outcome of the campaign. Nevertheless, whether viewed through a sympathetic or a critical lens, French operational performance in the region can hardly be described as satisfactory.
It is striking that even during the war, while interned as prisoners of war in a German officers' camp, several senior French officers who had served with the Seventh Army reportedly confronted General Winkelman and other senior Dutch officers over what they considered the poor Dutch performance in southeastern North Brabant. Winkelman himself was largely unaware of the extent of the French shortcomings and apparently felt somewhat embarrassed by the criticism. Only after the war did a more complete picture of French operations in the Netherlands begin to emerge.
The Belgians experienced a similar phenomenon. French commanders criticised them for abandoning the Scheldt Line, despite the fact that the withdrawal had been carried out on the orders of General Gamelin himself. Later, French commentators would also reproach the Belgians for their capitulation, even though King Leopold III had compelling military reasons for making that decision.
At the same time, any assessment of French performance must take into account that French soldiers were fighting on foreign soil. Hundreds of French servicemen lost their lives during the defence of the Netherlands. These men fought and died for a cause that was not directly their own, defending the territory and freedom of another nation. Whatever shortcomings may be attributed to the higher command, the ordinary French soldier merely carried out his duty, as soldiers of all nations did. Their sacrifice deserves recognition and respect.
Many of the French Army's difficulties stemmed from a failure to adapt to the realities of modern warfare. On paper, France possessed one of the most powerful armies in Europe and, in several respects, enjoyed advantages over the German Army. Yet it proved unable to cope with the operational and tactical methods employed by the Germans in 1940. The combination of rapid manoeuvre, concentrated armoured forces, close air support, and flexible command methods caught the Allies by surprise. In many ways, the French Army fell victim to its own confidence in doctrines and assumptions that had been shaped by the experience of the First World War.
The French would continue to play a complex role throughout the remainder of the conflict. The forces that rallied to General De Gaulle later demonstrated that France remained capable of producing excellent soldiers and commanders. Leaders such as Alphonse Juin and Philippe Leclerc de Hauteclocque proved themselves highly capable military commanders and made significant contributions to the Allied war effort.
One criticism frequently voiced by Dutch officers who served alongside French forces in May 1940 concerned the difficulties of coalition warfare. Many felt that French commanders were often reluctant to cooperate as equals with allied partners and tended to place French priorities above collective concerns. Whether this reflected institutional culture, national pride, or the pressures of a rapidly deteriorating military situation remains open to debate. What is clear is that such attitudes sometimes complicated relations with both Dutch and Belgian allies and contributed to the coordination problems that characterised the campaign